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Tripoli’s Militia Cartel 
How Ill-Conceived Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War 
Wolfram Lacher 
Since the establishment of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in 
Tripoli, in March 2016, a handful of local militias have gradually brought much of 
the Libyan capital under their control. Although nominally loyal to the GNA, these 
armed groups today in fact dominate the government. They have grown into crimi-
nal networks straddling business, politics, and the administration. The pillaging 
of state funds – a hallmark of Libya’s political economy – now benefits a narrower 
group than at any previous point since the 2011 revolution. Actors excluded from 
this arrangement are building alliances to alter the balance of power in Tripoli by 
force. New security arrangements for the capital are urgently needed to avert re-
newed conflict and prepare the ground for a broader political settlement. 
 
In March 2016, three months after the sign-
ing of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), 
the Presidency Council of the GNA arrived 
in Tripoli. Its main backers – the UN and 
Western governments – had strongly 
encouraged the nine-member Presidency 
Council to move to Tripoli quickly and 
create facts on the ground, even though 
it did not command any regular security 
forces to protect itself in the capital. This 
led the Presidency Council to rely on 
selected armed groups from Tripoli and 
Misrata for protection. The move was con-
troversial and contributed to the LPA’s fail-
ure. Two Council members who had already 
begun boycotting the body’s meetings 
would never rejoin the Council in Tripoli. 
In the year that followed the Presidency 
Council’s arrival, a handful of armed groups 
that backed its establishment in Tripoli 
took over much of the capital, gradually 
dislodging their rivals in a series of clashes. 
Since then, these groups have acquired an 
unprecedented degree of influence over 
state institutions in Tripoli. The four largest 
are the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, led 
by Haitham al-Tajuri; the Nawasi Brigade, 
led by the Qaddur family; the Special Deter-
rence Force (SDF), led by Abderrauf Kara; 
and the Abu Slim unit of the Central Secu-
rity Apparatus, led by Abdelghani al-Kikli. 
The transformation of Tripoli’s security 
landscape – from a complex patchwork of 
multiple groups into an oligopoly of large 
militias – has vastly improved security for 
the average citizen. The UN and Western 
embassies, which had tacitly supported the 
aggressive expansion of the pro-GNA mili-
tias, have demonstrated their confidence in 
the status quo by gradually re-establishing 
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themselves in Tripoli. However, the militia 
cartel threatens to thwart the UN’s ongoing 
attempts at brokering a more viable politi-
cal settlement and risks provoking a major 
new conflict over the capital. 
The Cartel’s Rise 
At the time of the Presidency Council’s 
move to Tripoli, few armed groups there 
had committed to supporting it. Those 
groups that supported the remnants of the 
General National Congress, elected in 2012, 
and its associated government rejected the 
Presidency Council as being externally im-
posed. The large armed groups from Misrata 
based in Tripoli partly joined their city’s 
political leaders in support of the Presiden-
cy Council and partly opposed it. Haitham 
al-Tajuri – whose armed group was then 
just one of many in the capital but has 
since grown into Tripoli’s largest militia – 
publicly mobilised against the Presidency 
Council as late as two weeks before it 
arrived. Many other armed groups in the 
capital kept their options open. 
The Presidency Council’s arrival forced 
armed groups in the capital to take sides. 
Which side a group found itself on was not 
always a matter of principle. Before the 
move, the Presidency Council had focussed 
on gaining the support of the Nawasi Bri-
gade and the SDF, both of which were based 
in the Suq al-Jum’a district and controlled 
the area around the naval base in which the 
Presidency Council took office. The SDF also 
controlled the capital’s only functioning air-
port. In a knee-jerk reaction, Tajuri’s group 
joined the Presidency Council’s supporters 
during the night of its arrival. Within days, 
Abdelghani al-Kikli’s group in the Abu Slim 
district entered this coalition. All four groups 
were in rivalry with other local militias 
over territory and assets; their rivals found 
themselves in the other camp by default. 
The Presidency Council rapidly fell under 
the influence of the militias protecting it 
and made little effort to reach out to others. 
These four militias then began to ex-
pand. The lines of conflict were defined in 
part by allegiances to the two competing 
governments in Tripoli; in part by ideo-
logical divides, as the SDF is dominated by 
Madkhali Salafists, who consider political 
Islamists to be renegades; and in part by 
turf rivalries. By March 2017, the four mili-
tias had taken over most of central Tripoli; 
in May 2017, they dislodged their remain-
ing opponents from positions in southern 
Tripoli. Only in the eastern district of Tajura 
did they continue to face tenacious oppo-
sition from local armed groups.  
The UN Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL) backed the militias’ expansion 
with its tacit approval, as well as with ad-
vice to GNA officials who liaised with the 
armed groups. This support rested on the 
expectation that the Presidency Council 
would gradually build its own force, the 
Presidential Guard, to protect itself. But the 
rapidly increasing influence of the four big 
militias ensured that the Presidential Guard 
could not grow into a significant force.  
The Economy of Expansion 
What allowed these four armed groups to 
take over much of Tripoli within a year? 
The budgets they received from the state 
cannot account for this. As with most other 
Libyan armed groups, the four militias were 
– and are – formally part of state security 
institutions; Tajuri’s, Kikli’s, and the Qaddur 
family’s groups are all part of the Central 
Security Apparatus, through which they 
cover salaries and operating costs. However, 
the heyday of militia expansion through 
government funding was in 2012/2013. 
Budgets for militias declined after the civil 
war that erupted in mid-2014 led state insti-
tutions to split. This did not change with 
the formation of the GNA. The Central Bank 
has granted the Presidency Council only 
limited access to funding. 
Instead, the financial basis for expansion 
lay in the revenue streams that armed groups 
developed as state funding contracted from 
2015 onwards. One effect of shrinking budg-
ets was a sharp uptick in kidnappings in 
Tripoli during 2015 and 2016. Militias 
 SWP Comment 20 
 April 2018 
 3 
also began establishing protection rackets 
during this period, such as taxing markets. 
More consequentially, armed groups 
seized opportunities presented to them by 
Libya’s worsening economic crisis, which 
prompted them to gradually penetrate the 
infrastructure of the financial system. 
From late 2014 onwards, confidence in the 
Libyan dinar eroded due to the collapse of 
oil production that started in 2013 and the 
split through state institutions since mid-
2014. The gap between the official and 
black market exchange rates widened, offer-
ing growing profit margins for those who 
could access hard currency at the official 
rate. This led armed groups in Tripoli to 
start “protecting” bank branches, to obtain 
privileged access to foreign currency at the 
official rate – initially, through small-town 
schemes such as getting banks to issue credit 
cards, then travelling abroad to withdraw 
foreign currency and returning to exchange 
it on the black market. A more sophisticated 
scheme was to obtain letters of credit (LCs) 
that supply foreign currency at the official 
rate for the importing of goods, then to im-
port less than the declared amount – or 
even nothing at all – and reconvert the 
foreign exchange into dinars on the black 
market. Militia leaders would extort branch 
managers or gain their complicity to obtain 
LCs for front companies. 
The increasing influence of armed groups 
over banks led to trust in the banking sys-
tem dropping further, as rumours spread 
that bank employees were colluding with 
kidnapping gangs to provide information 
on deposits. Fraud schemes also led the 
authorities to tighten access to foreign cur-
rency at the official rate, prompting traders 
to withdraw their deposits and obtain for-
eign currency on the black market. Togeth-
er with inflation, stoked by the declining 
exchange rate, these developments com-
bined to create a cash crisis. Since early 
2016, long queues at banks have been a 
permanent sight in Tripoli. 
The liquidity crisis offered yet more op-
portunities to armed groups, which were in 
the advantageous position that they could 
withdraw their salaries in cash as soon as 
banknotes arrived at a branch. Command-
ers established clienteles among ordinary 
citizens by offering privileged access to cash 
withdrawals, and they made profits by buy-
ing cheques from citizens at a discount, 
then converting them into cash for their 
face value. In addition, armed groups col-
lected monthly payments for protecting 
bank branches, in addition to the state 
salaries their members received. Paid con-
tracts to provide security also became the 
norm at all major state-owned enterprises 
and office buildings. 
These changes in the financial basis of 
Tripoli militias meant that their rivalries 
among each other had a strong economic 
dimension, and that territorial expansion 
could sustain itself, since new areas offered 
new sources of income. 
From Militias to Mafias 
Under the Presidency Council’s watch, the 
militia oligopoly in Tripoli has consolidated 
into a cartel. The militias are no longer 
merely armed groups that exert their in-
fluence primarily through coercive force. 
They have grown into networks spanning 
politics, business, and the administration. 
The fraud schemes involving LCs were a 
major driver in this evolution. Businessmen 
associated themselves with militia com-
manders to profit from LC fraud, then 
invested part of their gains in the armed 
group they allied with. The regulatory 
framework for LCs grew more complex 
because the Central Bank tightened over-
sight, the GNA’s economy ministry also 
established a committee overseeing LC pro-
cedures, and the Audit Bureau suspended 
an increasing number of approved LCs. To 
continue, actors engaging in LC fraud had 
to exert influence within these different 
institutions, as well as in bank branches 
and the customs administration. 
To pursue these and other fraudulent 
practices, commanders in Tripoli’s large 
armed groups began placing agents through-
out the administration. Since late 2016, 
new appointments in ministries and other 
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government bodies have been overwhelm-
ingly made under pressure from the mili-
tias. Through their representatives in the 
administration, the networks associated 
with the militias are increasingly able to 
operate in a coordinated manner across 
different institutions. According to politi-
cians, militia leaders, and bureaucrats in 
Tripoli, the Presidency Council and the 
GNA have become a mere façade, behind 
which the armed groups and their asso-
ciated interests are calling the shots. The 
vast majority of the new appointees are 
from Tripoli itself, undercutting the for-
mula of geographical proportionality on 
which the GNA had been based. 
The stranglehold over the administration 
exerted by the militia cartel means that the 
profits from the pillaging of state funds 
now benefits a smaller groups of actors 
than at any point since 2011. Unsurprisingly, 
this is fuelling serious tensions. A handful 
of Misratan militias are also present in 
Tripoli and support the status quo there, 
but the bulk of that city’s armed groups, 
and many of its politicians, increasingly 
resent their marginalisation by the Tripoli 
cartel. In Zintan, which hosts the second-
largest forces in western Libya, after Mis-
rata, such resentment is combined with the 
long-held desire to return to the capital and 
efface the humiliation suffered in 2014, 
when Zintani forces were forcibly dislodged 
from the capital by a Misratan-led coalition. 
The recent appointments of Zintani figures 
in senior positions in Tripoli are not suffi-
cient to assuage these ambitions. Yet an-
other force with designs on the capital is 
based in Tarhuna. 
Throughout the first months of 2018, 
actors from these three cities have attempted 
to build an alliance to enter Tripoli by force. 
The complexity of the alliances around the 
capital and engagement by UNSMIL have, 
to date, prevented such an offensive from 
happening. But the longer the current 
situation in Tripoli persists, the more likely 
it is that such forces will start a new con-
flict over the capital. 
Conclusions 
Over the past year, GNA officials and West-
ern diplomats have shared a sense that 
Tripoli is stabilising. But the current ap-
pearance of stability is deceptive. The way 
in which it has been achieved risks pro-
voking new conflict. The entrenchment of 
the militia cartel in state institutions will 
also pose an obstacle to any future political 
settlement. A new agreement on power-
sharing or a handover to elected institu-
tions will be hard to achieve as long as the 
occupants of formal government positions 
know that they will be strong-armed by the 
militias controlling their ministries. 
Western governments and the UN share 
responsibility for the state of affairs in 
Tripoli. They tacitly backed the establish-
ment of the militia oligopoly in a mistaken 
belief that this would allow the GNA to 
govern and establish its authority. The 
gradual re-establishment of the Western 
diplomatic presence in Tripoli also lends 
support to the militia cartel. A change of 
direction is urgently required. The UN 
should mediate between the stakeholders 
in and around the capital and attempt to 
negotiate new security arrangements. These 
arrangements cannot wait for progress in 
the political process to happen; in fact, they 
are a precondition for such progress. 
There are no quick, straightforward solu-
tions for security arrangements in Tripoli. 
Regular security forces can only begin to 
form and take responsibility once a more 
sustainable political agreement is reached. 
The current political situation only allows 
for temporary, ad hoc solutions. One option 
may be to negotiate rotating, joint deploy-
ments of two or three forces, starting with a 
few key locations, then rolling them out 
across the capital if they prove successful. 
Whatever formula is found, UNSMIL would 
likely need to adopt an active role in super-
vising its implementation. A longer-term 
strategy for engaging with Libya’s armed 
groups can only grow out of a serious effort 
to deal with the acute challenges they pose. 
Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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